Of the large industrial countries, Germany is clearly leading with regard to new renewable energy sources, occupying the first rank in terms of installed wind energy capacity, and the second rank in photovoltaics. This capacity is not due to an exceptional natural resource base but to its policy in this area, despite the fact that this policy was conducted in a rather lukewarm fashion until 1997. In any case, it led to a remarkable expansion of this sector. The red-green coalition, in office since 1998, developed the vision of achieving 50 percent and more of electricity generated from RES by 2050, a goal that seems well accepted by the public but not by the established energy interests or the leaders of the conservative-liberal opposition, even though its cost appears as comparatively modest. The article gives a historical account of German RES-E policy since 1974 and focuses in particular on the evolution of feed-in legislation from 1990 to 2004. The first 15 years of RES-E policy after 1974 were devoted to R&D. Market creation measures only came after 1988; of these, the Feed-In Law was the most important. During the 1990s, it barely managed to survive. Significant improvement occurred after the 1998 election; the new majority greatly strengthened RES-E support, particularly for photovoltaics and biomass. However, this legislation is not fully accepted on both the domestic and the EU levels.
and BDI of 1979-regularly modified and last updated in 1988-supposedly implemented this principle, which however was interpreted much less generously than it was under PURPA in the United States (Hennicke et al. 1985) .
The accident in Chernobyl in 1986 had a deep impact in Germany. Public opinion had been divided about evenly on the question of nuclear power between 1976 and 1985. This changed dramatically in 1986. Within two years, opposition to nuclear power increased to over 70 per cent, while support barely exceeded 10 per cent (Jahn, 1992) . While the social democrats committed themselves to gradually phasing out nuclear power, the Greens demanded an immediate shutdown of all plants.
Also in 1986, reports warning of an impending climate catastrophe received much attention, and in March 1987 chancellor Kohl declared that the climate issue represented the most important environmental problem (Huber, 1997) . On the national level the Committee for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety of the German Bundestag (i.e. the lower house of parliament) agreed to establish an Enquete Commission on Preventive Measures to Protect the Earth's Atmosphere, with the mandate to study the ozone problem as well as climate change and to make proposals for action. An inter-ministerial working group for CO 2 reduction was also established. The commission worked very effectively in a spirit of excellent co-operation between the parliamentary groups of both government and opposition parties. There was general agreement that energy use had to be profoundly changed. (Kords 1996; Ganseforth 1996) .
The first climate Enquete Commission recommended a goal of 30 percent reduction of 1987 CO 2 and methane emissions by 2005, and of 80 percent by 2050 (German Bundestag, 1991) 2 , and also a fundamental reform of energy policy. A series of proposals were formulated which included an electricity feed-in law for generation from renewables (Schafhausen, 1996) . There was growing consensus among MPs of all party groups that it was time to create markets for renewable energy technologies (Lauber/Pesendorfer, 2004) .
First Measures of Market Creation
In the late 1980s, several measures were adopted to create markets for RES-E technologies. These were in particular the 100/250 MW wind programme, the 1,000 solar roof programme and the creation of a legal basis for utilities to pay higher costs for RES-E than were "competitive" in the -actually quite distorted -market place (distorted because significant external costs were ignored for all practical purposes). market entrants were simply excluded from negotiations. In 2003, an Association Agreement was held to be unconstitutional. 2 This report recommended for Germany a 30 percent reduction by 2005 of CO 2 and CH 4 compared to 1987, and an 80 percent reduction by 2050 for both gases. The Commission analysed three energy scenarios to achieve this target: 1) Scenario "Removing Obstacles in Energy Policy": energy policy removes all major obstacles preventing efficient energy use and the growth of renewable energies; fuel prices approximately double in real terms by 2005; existing nuclear plants continue 2) Abandonment of nuclear energy; intensified efforts at energy efficiency, increased use of CHP and considerable increase of renewable energies, great increase of natural gas use 3) Expansion of nuclear energy (10 new reactors of 1,300 MW, which without any further CO 2 reduction measures could lead to a reduction of 31%). For this third option, it was not possible to find a consensus of the committee members. CDU/CSU and FDP supported this option, SPD and Greens opposed it.
When in 1988 two backbench conservative MPs in the Bundestag proposed a feed-in tariff to support wind energy, the government, to buy off the dissenters, initiated two important market creation programmes for RES-E: a 100 MW wind programme and 1,000 roof programme for photovoltaics (Kords 1993) . From 1991 to 1995, under the 1,000 roof programme applicants received 50 percent funding of investment costs from the federal government plus 20 percent from the Land government (in the new Länder the percentage was 60 and 10 percent respectively). Eventually 2.250 roofs were equipped with PV modules, leading to about five MW of installations (Ristau 1998; Staiss 2000: I-140) . As to wind energy, a programme for subsidising 100 MW -later 250 MW -of wind turbines (by a payment of € 0.04/kWh, later reduced to € 0.03) was legitimated by the need to gain practical experience with different approaches under real life conditions. As this programme in 1991 combined with the Feed-in Law, newly installed wind capacity very nearly exploded. In subsequent years, these subsidies declined rapidly (Hirschl et al. 2002) . Additionally, the legal framework for electricity tariffs was modified in 1989 in such a way as to allow compensation of RES-E generators above the level of avoided costs, a provision that was to play a role in the 1990s for the development of photovoltaics.
The 1990 Feed-In Law
Buying off support for a feed-in tariff was successful only for a short period of time. Soon afterwards, a new bill for such a tariff circulated among MPs, supported both by conservative (CDU/CSU) and green deputies who gathered support among the other parliamentary groups as well. In the end, the conservative leadership both in the Economic Affairs ministry and in parliament reluctantly accepted this idea; support came however from the Ministries of Research and of the Environment. A government bill was prepared after an unsuccessful, lastditch effort to secure a voluntary commitment by the electricity sector grant more favourable terms to RES-E. The bill secured consent from all parliamentary parties and became the Electricity Feed-in Law of 1990 (Kords, 1993) . The large utilities did not mobilise at that point, probably because they underestimated the importance of the law (which at first was expected to play a minor role, mostly for small hydro); also, taking over the East German electricity sector during reunification absorbed their attention.
The Feed-in Law required electric utilities to connect RES-E generators to the grid and to buy the electricity at rates of 65 to 90 percent of the average tariff for final customers (see table 1 ). Generators were not required to negotiate contracts or otherwise engage in much bureaucratic activity. Together with the 100/250 MW programme and subsidies from various state programmes, the Feed-In Law gave considerable financial incentives to investors, although less so for solar power due to the latter's high cost (Hemmelskamp, 1999) . One of the declared purposes of the law was to 'level the playing field' for RES-E by setting feed-in rates that took account of the external costs of conventional power generation. In this context, the chief Member of Parliament supporting the feed-in bill on behalf of the Christian Democrats in the Bundestag mentioned external costs of about 3-5 Eurocents per kWh for coal-based electricity. Before adoption, the law was notified to the European Commission for approval under state aid provisions. The Commission decided not to raise any objections because of its insignificant effects and because it was in line with the policy objectives of the Community. However, it announced that it would examine the law after two years of operation.
Between 1991 and 2000, the Feed-in Law provided for the following scheme of feed-in tariffs to support RES-E (variations from year to year are explained by the fact that rates paid out reflect percent of average end customers' rates. 
Challenges to the Feed-In Law
These incentives greatly stimulated the formation of markets and led to expansion for wind, from about 20 MW in 1989, to over 1, 100 MW in 1995 (Advocate General, 2000 . This encouraged technological and political learning in this sector (Jacobsson/Lauber, forthcoming), but also strengthened political resolve on the part of conventional electricity generators -particularly the supra-regional utilities -to attempt a rollback of this law, via both politics and the judiciary. This was more than just opposition to small and decentralised generation. First, no provision had been made to spread the burden of the law evenly in geographical terms; a satisfactory solution to this problem came only in 2000. Second, the utilities were by this time marked by the experience of subsidies for hard coal used in electricity generation which had grown from € 0.4 billion in 1975, the year the 'coal penny' was introduced, to more than € 4 billion annually in the early 1990s. Two thirds of this was covered by a special levy on electricity, one third had to be paid by the utilities directly but was also passed on to the consumers. 4 Political efforts to change the law seemed at first more promising. In 1996, utilities association VDEW lodged a complaint with DG Competition (a subdivision of the European Commission) invoking violation of state-aid rules. The Commission now expressed similar concerns due to "excessive" minimum prices for wind, considering the substantial advance of technology since 1990. Accordingly, it proposed possible amendments: reduce the minimum price for wind to 75 percent of average sales price (instead of 90 percent), limit the support mechanism in time or calculate the support on the basis of avoidable costs (Hustedt 1998; Advocate General Jacobs 2000, para. 20-21) . The Ministry of Economic Affairs -happy with this support -now proposed to reduce rates.
An intense political battle ensued, culminating in a massive demonstration in which the metalworkers union, farmer and church groups joined forces with environmental and RES associations (Hustedt 1998) . The confederation of investment goods industries gave a supportive press conference. Eventually the government amendment was narrowly defeated in the Bundestag. In 1998 the Energy Supply Industry Act was adopted to transpose electricity directive 96/92/EC and modified the Feed-in Law in several points. In particular, it created a new compensation mechanism for distributing the supplementary cost to the utilities. The 1990 law had provided a hardship clause according to which the upstream electricity supplier (usually operating a high-voltage network) had to take over the purchase obligation if it meant inequitable hardship for the supply undertaking immediately affected (i.e. in whose area of supply the electricity was generated). This clause -practically never applied -was replaced by more specific rules. Wherever electricity covered by the purchase obligation exceeded five percent of the total amount delivered by the supply undertaking concerned, the upstream network operator had to compensate that undertaking for the supplementary costs caused by this excess amount ("first ceiling"). A similar rule applied in favour of the upstream network operator, who could ask for compensation from a network operator situated further upstream if the compensation he had to pay exceeded 5 percent of his output ("second ceiling"). Where such an upstream operator did not exist, the purchase obligation did not apply to electricity produced in installations the construction of which was not completed before the end of the year in which the second five percent ceiling was reached (Advocate General Jacobs 2000, para. 15 and 30-33). In 1997, it was already clear that in some coastal areas the 10 percent limit would soon be reached and that wind power growth would stop unless an alternative solution was found.
This conflict led to insecurity for investors and stagnating markets for wind turbines from 1996 to 1998. At the same time, climate policy suffered a general setback at the governmental level due to the financial and other problems resulting from German reunification (Huber, 1997) . However, the issue was still strong with public opinion, more so than in most countries (Brechin, 2003) . When it became clear that the feed-in rates would remain unchanged, this resulted not only in a further expansion of the turbine market, but also in the entry of larger firms into the turbine industry and the business of financing, building and operating wind farms, again strengthening the advocacy coalition.
Other programmes
A federal energy research programme from 1990-1998 amounted to more than € 1 billion to all forms of renewable energy. The Länder contributed another € 0.85 billion for the period 1990-1997, most importantly North Rhine-Westphalia. Loan programmes by the federal government's banking institutions Deutsche Ausgleichsbank and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau permitted more than €3 billion in reduced interest loans for RES installations in the period 1990-1998. Other measures privileged wind turbines under the construction code (every local community had to present a plan with zones appropriate for wind power, which greatly facilitated permitting), reformed training programmes for architects, and stressed public information (Staiss 2000: I-140) .
Makeshift support for solar photovoltaics
While the Feed-In Law of 1990, combined with the 250 MW wind programme, led to the breakthrough for wind, solar photovoltaics did not benefit similarly. The 1,000 roof programme of 1989 had been a success and led to installations of 5.3 MW by 1993, but this market volume did not justify the installation of new production facilities in the solar cell industry. The Feed-In Law provided little help since rates did not come near PV costs, and a new demonstration programme was not forthcoming. If the industry was to survive, market creation had to come from other quarters. This led to intensified efforts to mobilise other resources, a process which demonstrated the high level of legitimacy that solar PV enjoyed in German society (Jacobsson/Lauber, forthcoming) .
The most important help came from solar activists and municipal utilities. The 1989 modification of the federal framework regulation on electricity tariffs -mentioned abovepermitted utilities to conclude cost-covering contracts for electricity using renewable energy technologies, even if these "full cost rates" exceeded the long-term avoided costs of the utilities concerned. While the supra-regional utilities generally rejected such an approach, local activists now petitioned local governments to impose such contracts on municipal utilities. Several dozen cities opted for this model, including Bonn and Nuremberg. As the process first started in Aachen, this is known as the Aachen model (Solarförderverein, 2002; Staiss and Räuber, 2002) .
5 Additional help came from several Länder market introduction programmes, most strongly in North Rhine-Westphalia. Some states acted through their utilities, subsidising solar installations for special purposes, e.g. schools (Bayernwerk in Bavaria, or BEWAG in Berlin). Some offered "cost-oriented rates" somewhat below the level of full cost rates (thus HEW in Hamburg). Finally, Greenpeace gathered several thousand orders for solar cell rooftop "Cyrus installations" (Ristau, 1998) . Due to these initiatives, the market did not collapse at the end of the 1,000 roof programme but continued to grow, attracting new firms and demonstrating public support for PV. Various solar energy organisations -many sprang up during this time -could draw on this when they lobbied for a larger market creation programme, e.g. Eurosolar's 100,000 roof proposal. Since 1996, the German Solar Energy Industries Association had worked towards this goal.
At the same time, some large German PV firms moved their production to the United States; this enhanced pressure on public authorities to come up with new support measures. On the promise of such a programme, ASE (one of the large cell manufacturers) invested in a new plant in Germany, which started production in 1998 with a capacity of 20 MW. Similar promises induced Shell to enter the German solar cell industry with a 9.5 MW plant in Gelsenkirchen the same year (Jacobsson/Lauber, forthcoming). These activities, new organisations and investments increased the pressure for market creation by the government.
Energy Reform and Liberalisation
Repeatedly after 1945, reforming the German electricity sector proved to be a difficult undertaking. Most reform attempts foundered due to the sheer financial clout and political power of the German energy supply industry (ESI) which is one of the industrial pillars of Europe's largest manufacturing economy. Already before 1990, it was partly privatised and 5
In 1989 Bayernwerk introduced the first 'green pricing' scheme, which involved investment in a 50 kW p plant. Many such schemes followed, for instance by RWE in 1996. About 15,000 subscribers eventually paid an eco-tariff (twice the normal tariff) for electricity generated by solar cells, hydropower and wind (Jacobsson/Lauber, forthcoming).
later opened for foreign investors. The powerful ownership links between the ESI and major financial and industrial interests in Germany indicate that this industry is an integral part of what Shonfield (1968) termed German "alliance capitalism" to describe the corporate culture of German industry, dominated by alliances with banking and insurance capital for decades. In contrast to competitive capitalism, alliance capitalism is characterised by collaborative relationships between commercial entities, and success relies on the concerted orchestration of large resources for common goals. With its huge turnover, vast profits and monopoly status, the ESI grew into the major cash cow of the German economy. Its political status was consolidated by links to state bodies at all levels and, through revenue sharing, to German municipalities by way of generous concession fees.
German electricity regulation traditionally relied on a mix of public and private law. Basic energy law was embodied in the Energy Supply Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz) adopted in December 1935 and laying down the framework conditions for a cheap and secure electricity supply. It defined German state control of the sector for more than 60 years. The other important piece of legislation is the Monopolies Act, which generally exempted electricity supply. Contracts for concessions, territorial boundaries, supply to special customers, the technical conditions for feeding surplus electricity into the grid, reserve deliveries and other arrangements are all based on private law.
There have been numerous attempts at reforming the German energy sector, but both bottom up and top down approaches always failed. In the mid-1980s, after he Chernobyl disaster, a strategic about-turn in energy policy and the re-municipalisation of electricity supply (Hennicke et al., 1985) were articulated and widely discussed. This has remained the policy position of the SPD and the Green party, and is also supported by local activists.
The introduction of environmental concerns into the German system was more successful than initiatives towards liberalisation. The Ordinance on Large Combustion Plants introduced strict limitations on all emissions such as SO 2 , NO x and particulate matter. With the restrictions it places on private property rights in favour of the environment, it constitutes an exemplary top-down policy tool (Mez, 1995) . The same applies to the Technical Guidelines on Air Quality. The Electricity Feed-In Law, enacted 1990 on the initiative of the German parliament, provides yet another notable environmentally oriented change in the framework conditions.
In response to long-standing criticism of monopolistic practices in the electricity industry brought forward by the German Monopolies Board (Monopolkommission 1976), the Deregulation Commission and international deregulation discussions, the CDU/FDP-led federal government after 1991 wanted to subject the energy sector to more competition and more effective public control. A first concrete reform proposal drafted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs in October 1993 included a partial break-up of the industry, third party access and stricter control of electricity prices. However, it was heavily modified subsequently and finally retracted in March 1994 because of open resistance from the municipalities and opposition signalled by the majority of the SPD-governed Länder in the Bundesrat, the upper chamber of the German parliament.
In autumn 1996, the German government submitted a second draft, this time backed by the EU reform process around the directive on the internal electricity market (96/92/EC, enacted on 19 December 1996). The reform's main goal was to reduce electricity and gas prices in order to strengthen Germany's international competitiveness. The draft included provisions to remove both the demarcation treaties and the single supplier formulae in concession treaties. Proposals for state control of investment in new power stations and transmission lines were dropped however. More than a year later, after much controversy, the Energy Reform Act (Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Energiewirtschaftsrechts) was passed, amending the Energy Supply Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz) of 1935, the Monopolies Act (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen) and the Electricity Feed-in Law. It entered into force on 29 April 1998. Only a few days later, PreussenElektra (now E.ON) took the law to the Constitutional Court, joined shortly afterwards by the SPD federal parliamentary party group and its Land counterparts from Hesse, Saarland and Hamburg. The energy policy spokesman for the SPD announced that a review of the new Energy Reform Act would enjoy priority under a newly elected, SPD-led federal government.
However, after the change of government in October 1998, the SPD lawsuits were suspended. Finally, on 28 September 1999, the government, the parliamentary parties of SPD and Greens as well as leading unionists signed a common statement confirming the basic principles of the energy law reforms, namely the end of demarcation treaties, full opening of the network for all suppliers and free choice of supplier for all customer groups (ARE 2000, 12) . Liberalisation made a little more headway in 2003 and 2004 (see below) .
Electricity liberalization favoured the expansion strategies of the energy giants. The trend towards internationalisation and globalisation of German energy undertakings is evident and led to mergers and higher yields. After protected markets and guaranteed returns, the new period is characterized by risk and insecurity. Deregulation was followed by some reregulation.
The New Energy Policy of the Red-Green Coalition
The new red-green Federal Government emphasised ecological modernisation and climate change policy as well as job creation and socio-economic development; energy policy was to be a leading example. It included tax reform (eco-tax on energy), phasing out nuclear power, and strengthening of renewable energy sources and of combined heat and power (CHP). Additional reform of the Energy Supply Act and of the Association Agreements followed in a second phase, in response to a 2003 court judgement that held a recent Associations Agreement unconstitutional. This led the government to agree to the obligatory provision of a regulator in the new electricity directive of 2003, to be implemented in 2004.
Nuclear power phase-out
The fundamental revision of nuclear policies reflected the consensus among Greens and many social democrats since the Chernobyl accident. The basic decision against the future construction of nuclear power plants was enshrined in the 2001 Nuclear Energy Phase-Out Act; licenses of existing plants were reviewed and limited in time. The legislative process was characterised by the government's endeavour to reach a consensus with nuclear power interests and to avoid legal disputes before the courts. Due to the powerful position of nuclear vested interests, these negotiations entailed many setbacks for nuclear opponents.
Climate change policy
Within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol and the European burden-sharing concept, Germany pledged to reduce GHG emissions by 21 percent from 1990 to 2008/12. In addition, the government in 1995 had pledged a 25 percent reduction of CO 2 emissions by 2005. Until 2000, a reduction of about 18 to 20 percent, corresponding to 180 to 200 million tons of CO 2 , was already achieved, so that the gap amounted to 50 to 70 million tons of additional reduction. This was to be achieved by the government's Climate Change Policy Action Programme of October 2000. Both RESA and the CHP Act are integral parts of this programme. These two areas of activity are expected to contribute reductions of 15 Mt CO 2 and 23 Mt CO 2 respectively, or about 50 percent of the target (Bundesregierung 2000, pp. 9, 77, 80) .
Government support for these two policy fields is likely to persist in the near future. For one, this policy area has been given high priority by Germany as host of various climate change conferences. Second, the two action packages mentioned above are likely to achieve real reductions, which is not true for all measures. However, within the current governmental actors constellation, it is primarily the Green Party and the Environment Ministry together with energy policy experts of the SPD -with a comparatively weak link to the Chancellor's Office or the Economic Affairs Ministry -which promote an active approach to German climate change policies and have shown serious commitment. In contrast, the Economics Ministry seems rather sceptical, stressing potential conflicts with German industrial competitiveness.
Eco-Tax Reform
This reform was passed as one of the first environmental initiatives of the new government in two consecutive laws which introduced a tax on the consumption of electricity (at a reduced rate for industry) and raised existing mineral oil taxes, i.e. on petrol, diesel, natural gas and various mineral oils. Tax levels for petrol, diesel as well as electricity increased in five steps until 2003 (see table 2 ). Coal and nuclear fuels were not affected. The tax is not levied on fuels used in CHP and decentralized production (up to 5 MW), nor for natural gas-fuelled power plants with an efficiency of 57.5 percent or more. The advantage for these sources of is up to 1.53 ct/kWh. But on the current low price market, this was not sufficient to bring about their expansion. 
CHP, end use efficiency
The efforts to increase efficiency are also reflected in support for CHP, whose share is to increase substantially from 12 percent in 1999, substantially below that of other European countries. A new act for the support of CHP plants for public supply -industry CHP is not affected by this act -entered into force in April 2002 and was supposed to create incentives for modernisation until 2010, leading to a reduction of some 11 million tons of CO 2 . It seems unlikely that the reduction goal will be reached (Mez, 2003a) ; CHP plants are under severe pressure since electricity liberalisation. Additional support is provided for small-scale CHP and fuel cells.
As to end use efficiency, activities were initiated in line with EU policy. As a first step, the Energy Savings Ordinance entered into force in February 2002. It set the total energy requirement of new buildings at 30 percent below current standards; for old buildings insulation requirements and exchange of heating systems were prescribed.
Renewable energy
The government formulated a target to increase the share of RES-E in the electricity supply to 12.5 per cent in 2010 and 50 per cent in 2050; in 2004 the goal of 20 percent by 2020 was added. The long-term target must be viewed as a programmatic goal, which in concert with energy efficiency programmes is ambitious but not unrealistic either technically or economically.
Several measures were taken in favour of renewable energy. They included a five-year market incentive programme for RES which provided about € 445 million from 1999 to 2002. A tax break on bio-fuels was applied in keeping with a EU directive on the subject. On the international level, the government in 2004 hosted the international conference on renewable energy in Bonn (Renewables 2004). As to RES-E, the most important measures adopted were the 100,000 roof programme for photovoltaics and above all the Renewable Energy Sources Act (RESA) adopted in 2000 and substantially amended in 2004.
The 100,000 Roof Programme Solar photovoltaics had not been able to develop much during the 1990s. The red-green government wanted to provide new impulses. As the design of a new feed-in regulation was expected to take time, another market creation programme along the lines of the 100 MW wind and 1,000 roof programme (both 1989) was adopted in January 1999 as a stopgap measure. It provided for reduced loans for PV roof installations; the goal was to achieve an installed capacity of about 300 MW. The programme was taken up slowly at first, but took off when RESA was introduced. By 2003, the two measures had led to installations of 350 MW. At that point, the 100,000 roof programme was terminated and PV market development turned over to improved feed-in tariffs.
The Renewable Energy Sources Act of 2000
While the parliamentary party groups of the red-green majority pressed for more favourable feed-in rates for RES-E, the Economic Affairs Ministry repeatedly delayed and diluted efforts (Lauber/Pesendorfer, 2004) . The big utilities were of course opposed; they placed their hope on a lawsuit pending before the European Court of Justice which challenged the old Feed-In Law as state aid, an argument that could be applied also to the new act. This was also the view of the opposition. The Economic Affairs ministry at one point even managed to persuade the government to postpone this legislation until the Commission had had a chance to react to it. But the two parliamentary party groups of the red-green majority managed to find important allies, particularly with the association of the investment goods industry (VDMA) and the metalworkers union. In April 2000, they adopted the Act on Granting Priority to Renewable Energy Sources; its declared purpose was to double RES-E production by 2010. This act, which became one of the pivotal acts of the red-green coalition (Mez, 2003) , repealed the Feed-In Law of 1990 but maintained an essential feature, i.e. the reliance on feed-in tariffs to encourage the development of RES-E. In many respects the law brought improvements for generators in terms of rates and above all of security. It also declared expressly that RES-E compensations should take external costs of conventional generation into account, and also support an industrial policy aiming at the long-term development of renewable energy technologies. 
Source: Staiss 2003: II-24
While under the Feed-In Law compensation rates were expressed as percentages of average end customer tariffs, the new rates were now fixed for 20 years (earlier on, there was no such guarantee, and prices had declined of late as a result of liberalisation). For wind power, they were made dependent on the quality of the location: all operators would receive a favourable rate for at least five years, thereafter the rate would decline, but later in the case of less favourable locations (see table 3 ). Rates were particularly favourable for PV, offshore wind and biomass. At the same time, there now was an annual decline in compensation for most sources (intended to reflect the learning curve), not for existing installations but for new installations and determined by the year they would go on line. A key regulatory element of the act was the distribution of costs from RES-E compensation across all power grid operators on a pro rata basis, calculated on the ratio of RES-E in nationwide electricity sales. Also, the utilities were now entitled to benefit from the special feed-in rates for their own RES-E generation facilities. This had not been the case earlier and might become lucrative for utilities, particularly in the case of highly capital-intensive investments such as those in offshore wind farms where they may beat back the new RES-E generators that arose in recent years.
The RESA Amendment of 2004
After the re-election of the red-green coalition in autumn 2002, responsibility for RES changed from the Economic Affairs Ministry (held by a social democrat and always sceptical of RES-E) to the Environment Ministry (held by a Green); the parliamentary committee in charge changed in a parallel fashion. This opened new perspectives. The first draft by the Environment Ministry led to a lively conflict with Economic Affairs minister Clement, a long-time politician from coal state North Rhine-Westphalia. Clement attacked the very principle of the feed-in tariff and wanted to replace it by a tender system, arguing that particularly for wind energy, rates were excessive. His main concern seems to have been to protect coal interests. After a compromise within the government, the red-green majority in parliament proceeded to revise the government bill largely against the preferences of Clement. However, Clement was successful in obtaining reduced rates for wind and in defending coal interests.
In the Bundesrat, the Länder ruled by conservative governments opposed the bill. The Bundestag (lower house) majority could simply have insisted on its earlier version. However, the red-green coalition negotiated with the conservatives in an effort to secure support for maintaining RESA beyond 2007. Some of these wanted an expiration date of 2007 for the Act, or a declaration reversing the nuclear energy phase-out; some criticised the 20 percent RES-E target for 2020. But the Conciliation Committee was content with more modest changes (exclusion of low-wind zones from the feed-in tariff), and the bill was adopted in both houses.
Chief changes (see table 4) are a general strengthening of generators vis-a-vis the utilities; reduction of rates for onshore wind and exclusion of low-wind zones, but also improved rates for off-shore wind; inclusion of hydro plants up a 150 MW, and significant new incentives for bio-mass (especially small plants) with additional bonuses for innovative technologies (Bechberger & Reiche, 2004 For non-built up areas, the decline increases to 6.5 percent beginning in 2006 Source: Non-official version of the Act before promulgation, from http://www.sfv.de/lokal/mails/wvf/eegtipps.htm, accessed 3 August 2004 * Rates are minimum rates except when marked by asterisk ** Time period for which an eligible installation receives the special rate. *** Installations connected in subsequent years will receive a rate (for 15-30 years) which is determined by the year of installation and which declines every year for that year's new installations. **** The five years apply to facilities achieving 150 percent of the reference installation (roughly equals a turbine with an average wind speed of 5.5m/sec). For other facilities the higher rate is extended for two months for every 0.85 percent that the facility remains below the 150 percent of the reference facility. For re-powering projects, the duration of the special rate is longer. ***** Longer if distance from the shore exceeds 12 nautical miles or if water depths are at least 20 metres or more.
Main actors in the RES-E arena
The red-green majority in power since 1998 was ambiguous on liberalisation at first; however, it came to accept this reform while still criticising the lack of regulatory oversight and the absence of sufficient environmental safeguards. Regarding the second point, some progress was made since the red-green coalition had a clear commitment to ecological modernisation of the energy sector. In practice though, policy changes were not comprehensive but rather incremental and restricted to a few key areas, i.e. nuclear, eco-tax, CHP and renewable energy policy. Each of these fields was managed by a different set of key government actors. These actors are far from presenting a uniform polarized picture, as evident in the various decision-making processes. In general, the parliamentary party groups are more reform-minded than some ministers, especially the minister of Economic Affairs, traditionally an advocate of the supra-regional utilities, of market liberalism and of industrial competitiveness.
Political actors  The first Economic Affairs minister of the red-green coalition, Werner Müller (1998 Müller ( -2002 , was a former utility manager (of RWE and VEBA) and long-time personal advisor on energy issues to chancellor Schröder. Legally he was in charge of energy market reforms such as regulating TPA or installing a regulator. However, the Minister rejected such activities, pointing to price decreases in the first two years after liberalisation as proof that competition was working. Market irregularities reported by market newcomers only led him to issue verbal admonitions of the ESI to correct its system of self-regulation (the Association Agreements); he did not question the system itself. In the nuclear phaseout negotiations, even though he endorsed the government's policy of ending nuclear power, he openly supported industry demands for an extended phase-out schedule and for exemption from additional financial burdens. Except for a late 2000 decision to establish a federal energy efficiency agency, no notable energy policy initiatives came from his department. On the contrary, he showed a strong rejection of regulatory intervention (as in the E.ON-Ruhrgas merger) and delayed key energy policy reform projects (CHP law, RESA).  Wolfgang Clement succeeded Werner Müller after the 2002 elections. He belongs to the business-friendly wing of the SPD and supports neo-liberal reforms to strengthen German industrial competitiveness. As a long-term politician from North Rhine-Westphalia, not only Germany's most populous state but also its most important coal producer, he is also an ardent defender of coal subsidies and in 2003 questioned the usefulness of the EU's uni-lateralism on the Kyoto protocol. He was successful in protecting the coal industry in the national allocation plan of 2004, opposed strong efficiency standards at EU level and attacked the basic principles of RESA on the occasion of its 2003/04 amendment. He opposed the introduction of an energy market regulator but yielded in 2003, though his department will probably make an effort to keep the regulator weak.  Chancellor Gerhard Schröder takes a mediating role, but in a number of aspects, particularly industrial policy issues, he tends to take decisions rather autonomously from his party base and to the disadvantage of environmental concerns. In a number of cases, he has openly responded to powerful industry interests. 6 A number of top decision making processes seem to be restricted to a small circle of high level politicians from Economic Affairs and the Chancellor's Office, with no information reaching the public This was the case with nuclear policies, electricity market mergers and TPA regulation.  Länder government are highly influential in certain policy areas, though they do not actively shape federal policies. Thus the governments of North Rhine-Westphalia, Saarland and Brandenburg exerted strong pressure on the federal government -in most cases on the Chancellor directly -to defend established coal interests. This was evident in the dispute over CHP policy, RESA and on the issue of continued federal support for coal subsidies in the face of European Commission's attempts at curtailment. Particularly with national elections approaching, programmes running counter to coal are banned from the agenda.  Environment Minister Jürgen Trittin (since 1998) is strongly committed to ecological modernisation but has to find a compromise between Realpolitik and his political ideals. He also takes a mediating position, which often compromises his Green Party background. In the nuclear phase-out negotiations, he represented the anti-nuclear forces. Over the course of the negotiations, he had to give up a substantial part of their early demands. He also had to make important concessions (to the Clement position) on RESA 2004 and the national allocation plan submitted in the same year.  The Green parliamentary party, in many aspects close to left-wing SPD representatives, is much more in touch with political realities and constraints than the party's influential membership base and may be regarded as the opposing pole. It is the main promoter of environmental interests and sustainable energy policy reforms. On the Renewable Energy Sources Act, it was Green and SPD parliamentary party groups which took the initiative, drafted and secured allies in favour of the law, both in 2000 and 2004. This is unusual for the German political system but has a certain tradition in the renewable energy policy due to the systematic delays by the Ministry of Economic Affairs (Kords 1993 , Oschmann 2000 , Bechberger 2001 ). The RES-E alliance includes environmental interests, the renewable energy industry, some business associations (investment goods industry, small and medium-sized enterprises), agricultural interests and some labour unions.  The social democratic parliamentary party is not as clearly committed to RES as the Greens. In recent years however RES supporters had the upper hand, though on occasion concessions were made to conflicting business or labour interests, as in the case of coal.  The opposition. Conservatives (CDU-CSU) and liberals (FDP) may return to power with the next parliamentary elections, scheduled for 2006. Currently their leaders challenge RESA and talk of replacing it with a system of quotas and certificates. It is evident that many MPs (particularly among the conservatives) do not favour such a radical approach. Recent attacks by conservative leader Angela Merkel on RESA did not prevent conservative Länder governments to vote for the 2004 RESA amendment in the upper chamber.  Another important, quasi-governmental actor independent from the federal government are the German cartel offices as well as the European Commission, particularly DG Competition. Until the regulator is installed (this should take place in the second half of 2004), they are the only authorities responsible for market oversight, if only ex post. Particularly in the most recent period, their influence was considerable in the area of merger control.
Economic actors
 The most influential actors are the supra-regional utilities, both economically and politically. While competing against each other, they have many things in common: They are all shareholder companies with, today, only minority public ownership; they are oriented on the international market; they own and operate the national transmission network, and through direct subsidiaries also most regional distributors; they have strong ties with the federal, Länder and municipal governments stemming from traditional ownership ties; they support coal and nuclear-based generation and the high priority these resources have traditionally had in German politics. Finally, they are the major providers of electricity for Germany's basic industries. Today, after the series of mergers, four supra-regional utilities are still active on the German market. For years, one of their leading associations was VDEW (Association of German Utilities), which also includes distributors. But in important political questions, the companies usually speak for themselves. As transmission grid operators, they are also organised in other, quite exclusive associations.  The municipal utilities are similarly influential. Due to public ownership, they were traditionally responsive to local and regional politics. Under monopoly regulation, the lucrative electricity business often served as revenue source for deficit-prone services such as public transport. Due to their significant role as public service provider and employer, they have a standing with local parties and community associations, trade unions and also with Länder and federal government representatives (particularly from the SPD but also parts of the CDU). Those which operate power stations are usually also members of the VDEW. However, the municipal utilities' most effective national lobbying organisation is the Association of municipal utilities (VKU).  ARE was the association of regional energy utilities and distributors. Since 1998 ARE lost almost half its membership due to mergers. Since the overwhelming majority of these distributors is now owned by supra-regional utilities, the political independence and relevance of the association greatly declined, while the regional utilities themselves form an important asset for the large utilities' access to end consumers.  On the electricity consumer side, the most important actors are the Federation of German Industry (BDI) as well as major industrial firms such as BASF, Siemens or Aventis (formerly Hoechst AG). They have strong ties to the Economic Affairs Ministries at federal and Länder levels as well as to the large electricity companies. Most of the major industries are also self-producers of electricity and thus members of the Association of Industrial Self-Generators (VIK), which at the same time has close ties to the ESI. VIK was an early proponent of liberalisation, expecting decreasing energy costs.  Less visible but not unimportant are the large banking and insurance companies as shareholders and/or financiers of large ESI investments. Their managers often are also on the boards of the large utilities; particularly the Deutsche Bank management has played an exceptional role in negotiating key public programmes such as the 1980 Contract ("Jahrhundertvertrag") supporting future coal use. However, in recent years their influence and even relevance may have receded, as suppliers are increasingly able to finance new projects and acquisitions from their balance sheets.  Another traditional actor in the energy policy arena is the trade unions. Today, energy industry employees are represented by three unions: IGBCE (miners, chemicals, energy); ver.di (formerly ötv), representing public service employees, e.g. utility employees; and IG Metall, uniting machinery and iron and steel industry workers. Their ties to the SPD with its strong electoral base in the industrial and mining regions of North RhineWestphalia and Saarland, and to blue collar workers in general, have historically been very close and still persist. The majority of the federal MPs of the SPD, the Chancellor personally as well as federal ministers of Economic Affairs usually endorse union demands (though not on the current issue of making the German economy more "flexible" through neo-liberal reforms), often relayed by Länder governments. While IG Metall and ver.di have become more open to a change in energy policy, are critical towards nuclear energy and support RESA, IGBCE by contrast ardently supports the coal industry, coal subsidies and nuclear power. Germany's concept for a nationally protected resource base of 15 percent (i.e. coal) to be allowed within a European energy policy framework stems largely from this union and the respective Länder governments.  Among societal actors, a number of environmental organizations give energy market reforms top priority. Greenpeace Germany, BUND and several others campaigned in support of renewable energy providers. They work together closely with some of the renewable energy brokers and producer associations. But beyond the promotion of renewable energies, co-operation in or even input into the political process have been scarce, even with their strongest political partners -Green party and SPD left wingbeing in office.
Conclusions
How did Germany come to occupy such a special position with regard to RES-E, and what precisely is the evolution and status of installed capacity? Is German RES-E regulationparticularly the feed-in tariff -successful in terms of usual economic and commercial criteria? Is it of such excellence as to invite imitation by other countries, and is it likely to survive in the future?
German leadership in this area is the result of a complex process. With few colonies in the nineteenth century, Germany until the late twentieth century was one of only two large industrial states without oil resources and no large oil corporation of its own (Karlsch and Stokes, 2003) , the other one being Japan. It came to rely with particular intensity on domestic coal, and later on nuclear energy. During the energy crises of the 1970s, coal and nuclear were nursed to impressive dimensions, politically as well as economically. But this policy also led to intense controversies and the rise of a strong anti-nuclear movement in the 1970s, a strong environmental movement in the 1980s, the spread of green ideas throughout society and the first big Green party in Europe. This counter-movement viewed renewable energy sources as an alternative to a nuclear plutonium economy, not merely as another additional source. Under pressure from this movement, governments reluctantly supported the development of renewable energy sources on a modest scale when compared to the funds spent on coal and nuclear energy, and not even for domestic use at first.
Even this limited and ambivalent support fell on fertile ground, as there was a broad range of people eager to play an active role in developing the new technologies -as researchers, farmers, technicians, entrepreneurs, customers etc. The first elements of change emerged: a small research community and first research facilities, with opportunities for experimentation, learning and the formation of visions of a future in which RES would play a central role.
In the second half of the 1980s, Chernobyl, forest die-back due to acid rain and the emergence of climate change as a political issue strengthened the demands for change, which were mediated creatively not by the government, but by the parliamentary groups of the political parties, sometimes indeed their backbenchers. They learned to pressure and if necessary to bypass the government, and in the late 1980s succeeded in practising first breaches in the system which had privileged coal and nuclear to the extent of locking out all alternatives. Their demands led to the first important measures of market formation in the late 1980s (250 MW wind power, 1,000 PV roof programme), and a little later led to the 1990 Feed-in Law which created powerful incentives to investors in renewables and encouraged the rise of an advocacy coalition capable of influencing the institutional framework.
The take-off phase for wind also led to an adjustment in beliefs. While liberals and most conservatives continued to see renewables as a 'complementary' source of energy, the Greens and the SPD parliamentary group developed much more ambitious visions of a transition to renewables, increasing their legitimacy in the process (Jacobsson/Lauber, forthcoming) . When the established actor network -utilities, Economic Affairs Ministry and DG Competition -attempted a rollback of the Feed-in Law in the mid-1990s, they met with opposition from a coalition which by a narrow margin was powerful enough to maintain regulatory continuity, one of the key criteria of success in this area (Haas et al., 2004) . Solar power developed only modestly during this period, but growing societal support increased its legitimacy.
When the red-green coalition took over in 1998, its parliamentary party groups -once more against the Economic Affairs ministry -soon took measures to improve the economics of RES-E. They also made PV attractive for the first time. For this purpose, the coalition drew in yet new actors into the RES policy network, composed of environmental associations, the renewable energy sector (equipment producers, owners and operators of installations and their associations), but also "conventional" associations such as investment goods industry association VDMA or the metalworkers union, which had joined the coalition during the preceding years. In 2003/2004, this coalition, supplemented by new allies, repeated this feat against renewed opposition from nuclear and coal interests.
In terms of growth of generation, the record of RES-E policy since 1990 is quite impressive (table 5) . Between 1992 and 2003, wind power fed into the grid increased by a factor of one thousand; this also applies to solar PV. Biomass-generated electricity grew by a factor of 177. Source : Staiss 2003: II-25 Due to the slow growth of small hydro, total RES-E volume under the feed-in tariff increased by a factor of about 30 since 1991. In absolute terms, German wind power installations represent slightly more than a third of the total stock worldwide; for solar photovoltaics the figure is similarly impressive. For the sake of perspective it must be added that all this capacity, together with hydro, still supplies less than 10 percent of electricity in Germany. However, there are plans to reach 50 percent by mid-century, as outlined above. At the same time, Germany developed a wind turbine industry which is second only to that of Denmark, and a PV industry second to that of Japan. These industries are expected to make key contributions to future exports.
What about the economics of RES-E in Germany? Compared to the subsidies paid out to coal or to nuclear reactor R&D, the funds spent on RES-E over the last few decades -R&D and market creation combined -are truly peanuts. In terms of current costs, wind energy is already competitive with coal if external costs are taken into account, a goal that helped legitimate the 1990 Feed-In Law and that is contained expressly in RESA. Electricity from German hard coal comes from the power plant at a total cost to society of about 10 Eurocents today, counting 3.6 Eurocents of generation costs, 2 cents of coal subsidies and 4.5 cents as external costs as estimated by the EU's ExternE programme (European Commission, 2003) . For soft coal, the figure is about 8 cents. By contrast, current (2004) wind power comes at about 7.5 cents under RESA 2000, declining to about 7 cents under RESA 2004 (Jacobsson/Lauber, forthcoming). External costs of wind energy are negligible. Costs for the more expensive RES-E technologies are substantially higher, but coming down fast. The idea behind this policy is that the energy transition may take decades, but will pay off in the end, environmentally as well as economically. Its overall cost to society -the cost of RESA 2004 to the average household in 2005 will be about €1.10 per month -seems perfectly reasonable. Amortisation within several decades is not unusual for such major infrastructure investments.
It is all the more ironic that a major political struggle was required merely to 'get prices right' (and to get away from a technology choice that was inferior from a social perspective), and that the "market" was and is actually invoked by the side which does not respect its basic principles of internalising external costs and a level playing field (Jacobsson/Lauber, forthcoming).
What is the future of the feed-in system? Since the adoption of RESA in 2000, feed-in laws based on similar principles (fixed rates, differentiation on site quality, scheduled decline of compensation for each year's new installations etc.) were introduced in a number of EU member states. The approach was also exported successfully to Brazil and Taiwan and is now considered by the Chinese government. But the European Commission -and especially DG Competition -used to be outspokenly critical of this approach and challenged it (in the form of the 1990 Feed-In Law) in the case of PreussenElektra v. Schleswag. 7 Even though the European Court in 2001 held that feed-in tariffs did not represent state aid or an undue impediment to trade considering its contribution to sustainable development, it took DG Competition about a year (until 2001) to stop state aid proceedings against the new RESA. RES-E directive 2001/77/EC remained neutral on this issue, but the Commission still favoured the quota/certificate system and was long expected to propose it as a harmonised system in 2005 or a little later (Lauber, 2002 and . Since the late 1990s, the Commission has argued that such a system was superior in inducing competition, driving down prices and thus accelerating the installation of new RES-E capacity.
As things stand at present, this claim is difficult to substantiate. The quota/certificates system is most advanced in the United Kingdom, where it was introduced in 2002. So far, it has led to prices per kWh which, for wind power, are substantially higher than those under RESA, despite the particularly favourable wind conditions in the UK which do not prevail in Germany. The main reason is the greater insecurity faced by British generators which must be compensated by additional rewards (Lauber 2004; Mitchell and Connor, 2004; Mitchell et al., forthcoming) . As to the record of installed capacity in the UK, it is slowly improving but not likely, within the next two decades, to approach German levels, despite a resource base, which is not only better but also much broader.
Whatever the empirical evidence, the feed-in tariff may be brought down by political forces inside Germany in case of a change towards a conservative-liberal government. As the liberals have been quite weak recently however, a conservative-green coalition is also possible and would probably lead to a different result. The liberals (FDP) support a quota/certificate system; so does the current conservative leadership, although not necessarily the majority of conservative MPs. While the supra-regional utilities currently also lobby for such an approach, they may become less insistent once they engage in large-scale offshore projects. Also, the condition of energy markets prevailing at the time of a system reform for RES-E is likely to play an important role; at oil prices around 40 dollars a barrel or more, there may be more promising issues, particularly considering RES-E's popularity in Germany. But even if such a change should take place, German RES-E equipment industry is likely to be better equipped for it than it was in the early years of its development, since the gap with conventional generation on the price per kWh will have been reduced and since exports will most likely have taken off by then. 
SPD

